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In many settings, people’s choices vary based on seemingly arbitrary fea-
tures of the choice environment.  Policies that manipulate these features to 
improve decision-makers’ well-being are paternalistic – unless one takes the 
unrealistic view that these features are relevant from the perspective of the 
choosers’ preferences.  In such settings, I propose that policy design can be 
less paternalistic if the only people assumed to be making mistakes are those 
whose choices are observed to vary based on the arbitrary feature of the choice 
environment.  I discuss several characteristics of such “quasi-paternalistic” 
policy design and conclude by applying the principle of quasi-paternalism to 
the policy choice of nudges versus mandates. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Suppose you are in charge of designing a retirement savings plan for some 
group of people (e.g., employees at your firm, residents in your state) and your 
goal is to make the people in that group as well-off as possible.  The specific 
choice you face is whether individuals will be automatically enrolled in the 
savings plan with an option to opt out, or whether the enrollment default will 
be non-participation and individuals will have an option to opt in.  Although 
the other features of the savings plan itself will be the same in either case, you 
know from past experience that more people will choose to participate when 
enrollment is opt-out than when it is opt-in.1  Which design should you choose, 
and how can you make this decision in a non-paternalistic way? 
Answering questions like this requires, first and foremost, a definition of 
paternalism, but traditional notions of paternalism are not up for the task.  As 
the concept is usually understood, a policy counts as paternalistic if it is justi-
fied on the belief that it will make a person better off than if the person had 
been left to choose between the available options for him or herself.  But in 
many settings, such as the savings plan example described above, recognizing 
and accounting for individual mistakes is the only reasonable way to go about 
 
*Assistant Professor of Law, Stanford Law School.  For helpful discussions, I am grate-
ful to Daniel Deacon, Ben Eidelson, Daniel Hemel, Christine Jolls, Cass Sunstein, and 
to Thomas Lambert and the participants in the Evaluating Nudge: A Decade of Liber-
tarian Paternalism symposium at the University of Missouri School of Law.  I am also 
grateful to the editors of the Missouri Law Review for excellent editorial suggestions. 
 1. For evidence of this type of effect, see, for example, Brigitte C. Madrian & 
Dennis F. Shea, The Power of Suggestion: Inertia in 401(k) Participation and Savings 
Behavior, 116 Q.J.  ECON. 1149 (2001). 
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designing policy.  That is, when individuals’ choices vary according to seem-
ingly-arbitrary features of the choice environment (such as which option is the 
default), policymakers can conclude one of two things: either (1) some people 
are making systematic mistakes (i.e., selecting the default option when they 
would have been better off under the non-default), or (2) which option people 
prefer truly depends on the feature of the choice environment that varies (i.e., 
the enrollment default).  Often, it is impossible to maintain the latter claim with 
a straight face – does anyone seriously believe that the amount most people 
should be saving for retirement turns on which plan they happen to have been 
defaulted into?  In such cases, one reaches the unappealing conclusion that any 
sensible approach to policymaking is necessarily paternalistic.2 
In this short article, I propose a distinction between two different forms 
of paternalism.  As a starting point, we can divide decision-makers into two 
groups. “Inconsistent choosers” are those whose choices vary based on some 
arbitrary factor under the government’s control (like defaults), and “consistent 
choosers” are those whose choices are not sensitive to such factors.  The basic 
idea in this article is that in some sense it is more paternalistic to make policy 
assuming that the consistent choosers are making a mistake than it is to make 
policy assuming that the inconsistent choosers are doing so.  Specifically, a 
policy is consistent choice paternalistic if it is based on the belief that it im-
proves the decisions of the consistent decision-makers – i.e., if it assumes that 
individuals’ voluntary choices are mistaken even when those choices do not 
vary based on any arbitrary factor.  In contrast, a policy is only quasi-paternal-
istic if it is designed to improve the choices of the inconsistent decision-makers 
but takes the choices of the consistent decision-makers to be correct.3 
Returning to the savings plan example, quasi-paternalistic policymaking 
assumes that those employees who decide to enroll in the savings plan under 
both the opt-out and opt-in enrollment defaults are actually better off partici-
pating than not participating.  And similarly, a quasi-paternalist policy assumes 
that those who choose not to participate under both enrollment defaults are in 
fact better off not participating than participating.  In contrast, quasi-paternal-
ism does not dictate anything about what policymakers should take to be the 
preferences over participation of those employees whose enrollment decisions 
vary based on whether or not participation is the default.  Because of this, 
quasi-paternalism can accommodate the belief that the inconsistent choosers 
are erring under one enrollment default or the other. 
 
 2. See Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an 
Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159, 1171 (2003), for the related claim that paternalism 
is inevitable.  As described below, my claim is slightly different: paternalism is not 
inevitable – it is just that the alternative is unappealing because it requires imposing 
unrealistic assumptions about the content of decision-makers’ preferences. 
 3. As described below, by “correct” I mean that the chosen option furthers the 
decision-maker’s goals and values at least as much as would any other option that the 
decision-maker could select. 
2
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 82, Iss. 3 [2017], Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol82/iss3/7
2017] LIBERTARIAN QUASI-PATERNALISM 671 
 
A key feature of the proposed distinction between quasi-paternalism and 
consistent choice paternalism is that it provides a way for traditional anti-pa-
ternalist concerns to inform decisions about choice architecture.  Critics of pa-
ternalism argue that paternalist policies are flawed because they interfere with 
individuals’ autonomy and because people know their own preferences better 
than the government does.4  As I argue below, quasi-paternalist nudges are as 
consistent with these principles as possible while simultaneously acknowledg-
ing the subset of decisions that appear likely to be mistakes. 
Although it is possible to nudge in a way that is quasi-paternalistic, some 
nudges go beyond quasi-paternalism.  Nudges are consistent choice paternal-
istic when the arguments used to support them are based on presumptions about 
the preferences of the consistent decision-makers that disregard the actual, ob-
served choices of the people in that group.  In fact, many of the arguments that 
have been advanced to support nudges fall into this camp.  For example, in the 
savings context advocates for nudging have argued that decision-makers are 
present-biased and myopic,5 which could apply equally to both the consistent 
and inconsistent decision-makers. 
In contrast to the possibility that nudges can be quasi-paternalistic, I argue 
that mandates justified on behavioral grounds are necessarily consistent choice 
paternalistic.  This is not for the usual reason – i.e., that mandates restrict peo-
ple’s choices; paternalism, as I use the term, is about the assumptions policy-
makers make about people’s choices and preferences when designing policy, 
not the substance of the policy itself.  Rather, mandates are not quasi-paternal-
istic because a mandate can be justified over a nudge on behavioral grounds 
only in settings where policymakers believe that the consistent choosers are 
making systematic mistakes.  To illustrate, consider a mandate to participate in 
the retirement savings plan discussed above. Intuitively, under a nudge (i.e., 
setting participation to be the default), all the inconsistent choosers select the 
default option.  Under a mandate, all the consistent and also all of the incon-
sistent decision-makers do so.  Since the inconsistent choosers end up making 
the same decision under both the mandate and the nudge, a necessary condition 
for the mandate to achieve higher social welfare than the nudge is that it makes 
the consistent choosers better off (relative to the nudge).  But for this to be true, 
it must be the case that the consistent choosers who choose against enrolling in 
the plan would actually be better off if they were forced to enroll.  This as-
sumption – that the preferences revealed by the consistent choosers’ choices 
are mistaken – is the very condition that disqualifies a policy from being quasi-
paternalistic. 
There is a large and ongoing debate among legal scholars about whether 
paternalistic policies are an appropriate response to the findings of behavioral 
 
 4. See Alan E. Fuchs, Autonomy, Slavery, and Mill’s Critique of Paternalism, 4 
ETHICAL THEORY & MORAL PRAC. 231, 236 (2001). 
 5. See, e.g., RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING 
DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 103–17 (2008).  In fairness, 
these authors include other rationales for nudging as well. 
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economics.  My goal in this short article is not to persuade anti-paternalists that 
all forms of behaviorally motivated policy interventions are justifiable but 
simply that such concerns are differently implicated according to whether a 
policy is consistent choice paternalistic or quasi-paternalistic.  And similarly, 
for those who are already convinced that the presence of individual mistakes 
makes deviations from traditional non-paternalism desirable, my goal is to ar-
gue that the concerns informing traditional non-paternalism can usefully enter 
the debate about which types of behaviorally informed policies to adopt. 
The remainder of this article proceeds as follows.  Part I briefly describes 
a number of background concepts and reviews the reason nudging is seen to be 
paternalistic.  Part II then sets out the notion of quasi-paternalism and describes 
several of its features.  Part III illustrates the concept by explaining how quasi-
paternalism provides a ground for preferring nudges to other policy tools that 
restrict choice, such as mandates. 
II.  BACKGROUND AND TERMINOLOGY 
Consider a group of individuals who each face an identical choice.  Each 
must select one option from a set of available alternatives.  Each has some set 
of priorities for what he or she cares about, reflecting the person’s goals and 
values (whatever they may be).  A person’s “preferences” over the available 
options refer to the relative ranking of the options according to how consistent 
each is with the furtherance of the person’s priorities.6  For example, if Bob 
prefers option X to option Y, this means that X is more consistent with Bob’s 
priorities than is Y. 
Following a number of recent papers,7 I define nudges in terms of a poli-
cymaker’s choice of frame.  A “frame” is a feature of the decision-making en-
vironment that affects what people choose (for at least some choosers) but that 
is irrelevant from the point of view of the choosers’ preferences.8  For example, 
 
 6. The ranking of options embedded in one’s preferences is based on whatever 
information is available to the decision-maker at the time of the decision.  Note that 
this understanding of preferences differs from the “revealed preferences” approach tra-
ditionally employed in welfare economics – if preferences were defined to be identical 
to one’s choices, there would be no space for individuals to make mistakes, and so any 
value to policies like nudges would be ruled out. 
 7. See, e.g., Jacob Goldin, Which Way to Nudge? Uncovering Preferences in the 
Behavioral Age, 125 YALE L.J. 227 (2015); Jean-Michel Benkert & Nick Netzer, In-
formational Requirements of Nudging (U. Zurich, Dept. Econ., Working Paper No. 190, 
2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2597631.  Although less 
concise than other ways of defining a nudge, a virtue of this approach is that it makes 
precise which types of policy tools are being discussed and facilitates formal analysis 
of their characteristics.  For a discussion of related issues, see Brian Galle, What’s in a 
Nudge, ADMIN. L. REV. (forthcoming). 
 8. Yuval Salant & Ariel Rubinstein, (A,f): Choices with Frames, 75 REV. ECON. 
STUD. 1287, 1287 (2008) (defining a frame to be “irrelevant in the rational assessment 
of the alternatives”).   This definition of a frame is slightly stricter than the one in 
4
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a frame might denote the order in which the available options are presented to 
the chooser, which option is labeled as the default, or any manner of variations 
in which the choice is presented (as long as none of those variations affect 
which menu option the chooser actually prefers). 
In many settings, policymakers have flexibility over which frame to im-
plement.  For example, if the government runs a website through which people 
purchase health insurance,9 the government must decide the order in which to 
list the available plans and which features of the plans to make salient.  Simi-
larly, the government may choose to regulate how private companies present 
various choices to consumers, such as whether retailers present credit card fees 
as surcharges or discounts relative to paying with cash.10 
A “nudge” refers to a decision to adopt one frame over another in a par-
ticular choice setting in order to promote the well-being of the people facing 
the choice.11  For example, suppose that government employees are more likely 
to enroll in an employer-sponsored retirement savings plan when they are au-
tomatically enrolled into it upon beginning their employment, as compared to 
when participating requires them to affirmatively opt in.  Assuming employ-
ees’ preferences over participating in the plan are unrelated to whether or not 
participation is the default, the nature of enrollment into the plan (i.e., whether 
it is opt-in or opt-out) represents a frame.  If the government determines that 
employees would be better off participating in the plan than not participating, 
designing the plan to have opt-out enrollment would constitute a nudge. 
An important feature of this definition of a nudge is the requirement that 
it be intended to promote the well-being of the people facing a particular 
choice.  This excludes situations in which one adopts a particular frame to af-
fect people’s decisions in ways that are primarily intended to benefit third par-
ties.  For example, one widely discussed policy is changing the default for or-
gan donor status so that it is an opt-out system instead of an opt-in system.12  
The rationale for this policy is not primarily to make the potential donors them-
selves better off (such as by correcting their mistakes about whether to donate), 
but rather to improve the well-being of the potential organ recipients.  Or sim-
ilarly, changes in the choice architecture that promote green energy use13 or a 
 
Goldin, supra note 7, at 238, in that it does not allow as a frame some variation that 
imposes transaction costs on selecting one particular option or another. 
 9. See, e.g., HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov (last visited Aug. 
15, 2017). 
 10. See Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144, 1150–51 
(2017).  For one perspective on this issue, see Todd J. Zywicki, Geoffrey A. Manne & 
Kristian Stout, Behavioral Economics Goes to Court: The Fundamental Flaws in the 
Behavioral Law & Economics Arguments Against No-Surcharge Laws, 82 MO. L. REV. 
769 (2017). 
 11. THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 5–6. 
 12. See, e.g., Eric J. Johnson & Daniel Goldstein, Do Defaults Save Lives?, 302 
SCIENCE 1338 (2003). 
 13. See Cass R. Sunstein & Lucia A. Reisch, Automatically Green: Behavioral 
Economics and Environmental Protection, 38 HARV. ENVTL. L.R. 127 (2014). 
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reduction in use of plastic bags are primarily motivated by their positive envi-
ronmental effects,14 rather than the goal of making the affected decision-mak-
ers better satisfy their own preferences.15 
Turning from the definition of a nudge to the definition of paternalism, 
one is immediately struck by the large number of definitions of paternalism 
used in the literature.16  However, many of these definitions share common 
themes.  As Sunstein puts it in his contribution to this volume, “the unifying 
theme of paternalistic approaches is that a private or public institution does not 
believe that people’s choices will promote their welfare, and it is taking steps 
to influence or alter people’s choices for their own good.”17  In other words, a 
policy is paternalistic if it is implemented on the belief that it causes decision-
makers to make choices that better reflect their own preferences than the 
choices they would otherwise make.  In contrast, a non-paternalistic policy as-
sumes people’s voluntary choices reflect their preferences. 
When paternalism is understood this way, nudges are paternalistic by def-
inition.18  This conclusion follows from the key property of a frame – that it 
affects choice but does not affect preferences.  Consider a person whose choice 
is affected by the frame – i.e., who selects one option (call it X) under one frame 
and a different option (call it Y) under a second frame.  Because the person’s 
preference for X versus Y is, by assumption, unaffected by the change in frame, 
we know that the person’s most-preferred option must be the same under both 
frames as well.  Yet because the person chooses a different option under the 
two different frames, we know that the person must not be selecting his or her 
most-preferred option under either the first frame or under the second frame.  
And because our definition of a nudge requires that the choice of frame be 
governed by the policymaker’s belief over which frame will best promote the 
choosers’ well-being, it satisfies the definition of paternalism.  Put differently,  
 14. Tatiana A. Homonoff, Can Small Incentives Have Large Effects? The Impact 
of Taxes Versus Bonuses on Disposable Bag Use (Princeton U., Indus. Relations Sec-
tion Working Paper No. 575, 2013). 
 15. An even more extreme example concerns changes in a frame that are intended 
to benefit third parties by causing the directly affected decision-makers to make mis-
takes.  For examples along these lines, see Jacob Goldin, Optimal Tax Salience, 131 J. 
PUB. ECON. 115 (2015), and Benjamin R. Handel, Adverse Selection and Inertia in 
Health Insurance Markets: When Nudging Hurts, 103 AM. ECON. REV 2643 (2013). 
 16. See JONATHAN QUONG, LIBERALISM WITHOUT PERFECTION 73–107 (2010), 
for an overview and critical discussion of a number of these definitions. 
 17. Cass R. Sunstein, Forcing People to Choose Is Paternalistic, 82 MO. L. REV. 
643 (2017). 
 18. For a nice exposition of this argument, see Robert Sugden, Why Incoherent 
Preferences Do Not Justify Paternalism, 19 CONST. POL. ECON. 226, 231–33 (2008) 
(“If a person’s choices over given options are affected by variables that cannot credibly 
be claimed to have any corresponding influence on well-being, and if we subscribe to 
any specific consequentialist theory of well-being, we can infer that some of those 
choices are not promoting that person’s well-being.”)  As the title of this article sug-
gests, Sugden ultimately disagrees with my conclusion here.  The source of disagree-
ment stems from Sugden’s embracing a non-welfarist approach to policy-making. 
6
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 82, Iss. 3 [2017], Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol82/iss3/7
2017] LIBERTARIAN QUASI-PATERNALISM 675 
 
a nudge is paternalistic because it involves selecting a frame based on the idea 
that at least some decision-makers would make mistakes if a different frame 
were to be implemented instead. 
Given that nudges are inherently paternalistic, someone hoping to follow 
a non-paternalist approach to policymaking might reasonably ask what alter-
natives are possible.  One possibility is for the government to choose between 
alternative frames without trying to maximize the choosers’ well-being, or to 
leave the choice of frame to private parties.  As others have pointed out, this 
approach suffers from the obvious disadvantage that it may result in frames 
being adopted that do not maximize decision-makers’ preferences.19  For ex-
ample, private firms may choose to adopt frames that maximize profits rather 
than total social welfare.  Note that these approaches avoid paternalism not by 
challenging whether decision-makers are making mistakes but by challenging 
how (or if) the government should respond to those mistakes in the first place. 
A seemingly more attractive possibility for avoiding paternalism is to 
simply avoid basing policy on the belief that decision-makers are making mis-
takes.  That is, instead of assuming that the feature of the decision-making en-
vironment that affects choices represents a frame, policymakers might instead 
assume that the feature is relevant to the decision-makers’ preferences.  Thus, 
if some people choose differently in one choice setting than in another, one 
would simply assume that for those people, the variation between choice set-
tings is something that is relevant to their preferences.  Thus if more employees 
decide to participate in an employer savings plan when there is opt-out enroll-
ment than when there is opt-in enrollment, one would assume those employees 
are better off participating than not participating in the opt-out plan and would 
be better off not participating than participating under the opt-in plan.  For ex-
ample, following the default option might allow people to avoid suffering the 
hassle costs of filling out the paperwork and spending the mental effort deter-
mining how much to save. 
This approach, while avoiding paternalism, often does so at the cost of 
making unrealistic assumptions about the content of people’s preferences.  
That is, the only way to avoid concluding that an observed choice reversal rep-
resents a frame is by assuming that the thing that has changed is relevant to the 
choosers’ preferences.  But in many cases this assumption is simply not realis-
tic.  To return to the retirement example, although it is theoretically possible 
that the difference in behavior in the opt-in versus opt-out settings is not a mis-
take, it seems exceedingly unlikely that one’s priorities about how much to 
save for retirement (a major financial decision!) would turn on whether or not 
one has to spend a few minutes filling out a form.20  
 19. See, e.g., THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 85. 
 20. See B. Douglas Bernheim, Andrey Fradkin & Igor Popov, The Welfare Eco-
nomics of Default Options in 401(k) Plans, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 2798, 2799 (2015) 
(“In a conventional model [of 401(k) saving], unrealistically large opt-out costs (aver-
aging thousands of dollars) are required to rationalize default effects.”).  In other cases 
it can be difficult for an outsider to determine if something is a frame or not, since doing 
so requires making a judgment about the decision-makers’ priorities.  For example, 
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Thus, the standard view of paternalism creates a dilemma for anti-pater-
nalists. One is either forced to adopt an unrealistic view about the content of 
people’s preferences (essentially assuming away the possibility of irrational 
behavior), or one must acknowledge that certain frames will better promote 
welfare than others.  The dilemma is that it is difficult to accept the latter (and 
only reasonable) perspective, while also arguing that the government should 
not take these differences between frames into account when choosing between 
them.  The remainder of this article sketches a new understanding of paternal-
ism better suited for analyzing policy-making in such settings. 
III. QUASI-PATERNALISM 
This Part proposes a distinction between two different forms of paternal-
ism and argues that the distinction is useful for analyzing behaviorally in-
formed policy-making.  The key feature of this approach is that it differentiates 
between the people whose choices are affected by the frame (the inconsistent 
choosers) and those whose choices are unaffected by the frame (the consistent 
choosers).21  In particular, a policy is consistent choice paternalistic if it is 
based on the view that the voluntary choices of the consistent choosers do not 
reflect their preferences.  In contrast, a policy is quasi-paternalistic if it is based 
on the view that it improves the choices of the inconsistent choosers, while 
accepting that the choices of the consistent choosers reflect that group’s pref-
erences. 
Both consistent choice paternalism and quasi-paternalism meet the defi-
nition of traditional paternalism in that they are both premised on the notion 
that (at least some) people’s voluntary choices will not promote their own wel-
fare.  The difference between them is that quasi-paternalism limits this pre-
sumption to the people whose choices vary according to the frame.  As I argue 
below, treating the voluntary choices of these inconsistent choosers as mistakes 
is, in certain senses, less paternalistic than treating the voluntary choices of the 
consistent choosers as mistakes.22 
 
someone may choose not to accept a very small risk of death from flying between two 
locations but be willing to accept a larger risk of death from driving between the same 
two locations.  Whether or not such behavior represents a framing effect depends on 
whether the decision-maker’s priorities differentiate between a risk of death from driv-
ing and an equal-size risk of death from flying. 
 21. See Goldin, supra note 7, at 242. 
 22. In an influential article, Bernheim and Rangel propose a measure of individual 
welfare in which option A is preferred to option B if the decision-maker would select A 
over B under each choice setting in which both are available (i.e., under every frame).  
See B. Douglas Bernheim & Antonio Rangel, Beyond Revealed Preference: Choice-
Theoretic Foundations for Behavioral Welfare Economics, 124 Q.J. ECON. 51, 53 
(2009).  This approach is related to the one described here in that both attach additional 
significance to the choices of decision-makers unaffected by a frame, but unlike Bern-
heim-Rangel, the framework described here does not assume away the possibility that 
even inconsistent decision-makers have normatively relevant preferences over the 
8
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Having set out the definition of quasi-paternalism, the remainder of this 
Part considers four observations about the concept. 
Observation 1: Quasi-paternalism can accommodate observed choice 
reversals. 
The main advantage of relaxing the traditional definition of paternalism 
is to accommodate the evidence that some people’s choices vary systematically 
in response to seemingly arbitrary factors (i.e., the evidence that frames mat-
ter).  As described above, traditional conceptions of non-paternalism require 
making the dubious assumption that whenever people choose differently be-
tween various choice settings, those differences are the result of preference-
relevant features of the choice – i.e., that frames do not exist.23  In contrast, a 
quasi-paternalistic policy treats inconsistent choosers as if they are making 
mistakes in one of the frames.  Thus, although quasi-paternalism requires mak-
ing a paternalistic judgment with respect to some of the decision-makers, the 
payoff to doing so is the ability to avoid making unrealistic assumptions about 
the content of decision-makers’ preferences. 
Observation 2: Not all nudges are quasi-paternalistic. 
Whether or not a nudge is paternalistic depends on the reasoning that mo-
tivates the policy rather than the content of the policy itself.  Thus, the same 
nudge may be either quasi-paternalistic or consistent choice paternalistic de-
pending on the reasons for which it is adopted.  Specifically, if a particular 
nudge is justified based on the idea that it does not affect the well-being of the 
consistent choosers but that it causes the inconsistent choosers to make a choice 
more in keeping with their preferences, it will be quasi-paternalistic.  In con-
trast, if the argument for that nudge was instead premised on the belief that the 
consistent choosers are making a mistake, the nudge would be consistent 
choice paternalistic rather than quasi-paternalistic. 
To illustrate, return to the example of a government employer deciding 
whether enrollment into its retirement plan will be opt-in or opt-out.  Suppose 
we know that half of the employees will choose whether to participate based 
on the default, and suppose further that we know that ninety percent of the 
 
available options.  Making that assumption would eliminate any scope for nudges to 
raise social welfare by improving the consistency of decision-makers’ choices with 
their preferences. 
 23. To clarify this point, recall that a frame is defined as a feature of a choice 
setting that is preference-irrelevant and that affects the choices of at least some deci-
sion-makers.  If a frame were to exist, it would mean that people’s choices varied sys-
tematically based on some arbitrary difference between choice settings, which would 
in turn imply that people were choosing incorrectly in at least one of the choice settings.  
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employees who are consistent will choose not to participate.  As in many sim-
ilar settings, assume that we have no direct evidence about the preferences of 
the inconsistent choosers.  Suppose that the employer decides to adopt partici-
pation as the enrollment default out of a concern that employees tend to under-
save for retirement and are present biased in making savings decisions.24  Note 
that although ninety percent of the consistent choosers make choices suggest-
ing they prefer not participating, this reasoning suggests that many of those 
employees would in fact be better off if they were to participate.  Hence, adopt-
ing a default of participation on this type of rationale would not be quasi-pa-
ternalistic because it would imply that even the consistent choosers were mak-
ing a mistake. 
In contrast, determining that a default rule of participation is welfare-en-
hancing would be quasi-paternalistic if the reasoning took the voluntary 
choices of the consistent choosers to be correct.25  What this avoids is ap-
proaching the nudge as a way to correct some unrelated bias (like under-saving) 
on the part of the decision-maker.  There are a number of approaches for setting 
nudges that take as their starting point the premise that consistent choosers are 
making the correct decision.26 
Observation 3: Quasi-paternalism is “inevitable,” but consistent 
choice paternalism is not. 
One of the strongest arguments in favor of nudging is that choices about 
how choice architecture should be designed are inevitable.27  Although deci-
sions about choice architecture are inevitable, it is not strictly true that nudging 
itself is inevitable, since, as discussed above, policymakers could treat deci-
sions about choice architecture as being about preference-relevant features of 
the decision (rather than frames).  Thus, at least under the definition of a nudge 
used here, one can avoid nudging by making policy in a way that assumes even 
the inconsistent choosers are not making a mistake. But, to the extent one 
wishes to avoid making the often unrealistic assumption that these choice re-
versals reflect preference-relevant differences between the choice settings, then 
at least quasi-paternalism is inevitable. 
However, the fact that quasi-paternalism is inevitable does not imply that 
other forms of paternalism are also inevitable.  That is, the fact that some deci-
sion-makers are clearly making a mistake does not imply that other decision-
 
 24. See, e.g., Shlomo Benzarti & Richard H. Thaler, Heuristics and Biases in Re-
tirement Savings Behavior, 21 J. ECON. PERSP. 81 (2007). 
 25. In another work, a coauthor and I have referred to this starting point as “the 
consistency principle.”  See Jacob Goldin & Daniel H. Reck, Revealed Preference 
Analysis with Framing Effects 1 (working paper 2017), https://pa-
pers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=2417709. 
 26. See id.; see also Goldin, supra note 7. 
 27. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 83–87. 
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makers – those whose choices are insensitive to the seemingly arbitrary factors 
– are also making mistakes. 
Even if stronger forms of paternalism are not inevitable, they may still be 
appropriate if there is convincing evidence that the consistent choosers are 
making errors in the choice setting under consideration.  Consider a retirement 
savings plan with automatic enrollment, for example, and suppose that the vast 
majority of the employees who opt out of participation come to regret their 
decision not to participate.28  These employees are consistent with respect to 
the participation default29 but, nonetheless, may well be making a mistake in 
their participation decision because of some other bias such as myopia or pre-
sent bias that causes them to under-save.30  Whether a welfarist should embrace 
consistent choice paternalism in settings of this type depends on the strength 
of the evidence that the choices of the consistent choosers are mistaken. 
Observation 4: The distinction between quasi-paternalism and con-
sistent choice paternalism tracks the concerns that underscore tradi-
tional arguments against paternalism. 
Traditionally, non-paternalism is often advocated based on two types of 
arguments, one welfarist and one non-welfarist.  The welfarist argument, most 
strongly associated with John Stuart Mill, is that individuals are more likely to 
know which of some set of available options is better for them than is the gov-
ernment.31  This presumption is undermined by evidence that frames affect be-
havior – in such cases, one must balance the empirical predictive power of this 
presumption against the likelihood that decision-makers’ preferences really do 
depend on features of the choice environment that appear to be arbitrary.  And 
although Mill’s presumption is likely to be a good rule of thumb, in many cases 
it will not be stronger than the competing belief that the decision-maker is mak-
ing a mistake.  For example, when savings plan enrollment decisions turn on 
whether enrollment is automatic, it seems more likely that Mill’s presumption 
is incorrect than it is that differences between the two enrollment designs re-
flect different preferences over how much to save. 
Although settings characterized by framing effects undermine the 
strength of Mill’s presumption for inconsistent choosers, they do not do so for 
consistent choosers. For the same reasons that one would normally assume that 
the goals of an employee who chooses to participate in a 401(k) plan would be 
 
 28. Such evidence might take the form of survey responses accompanied by a de-
cision to opt back in to participation. 
 29. Assuming, as I do here, that someone who chooses not to participate under 
automatic enrollment would also choose not to participate if enrollment were opt-in. 
 30. For a number of arguments along these lines, see Ryan Bubb & Richard H. 
Pildes, How Behavioral Economics Trims Its Sails and Why, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1593, 
1612–14 (2014). 
 31. John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in ON LIBERTY 5, 7–8 (Stefan Collini ed., Cam-
bridge Univ. Press 1989) (1859).  
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better served by enrolling the employee in the plan than by excluding the em-
ployee from the plan, one should also assume that an employee who consist-
ently chooses to participate in a retirement plan (under both an opt-in and opt-
out enrollment design) would, in fact, be better off participating in the plan 
than not participating.  Put differently, evidence that a frame affects the behav-
ior of some decision-makers does not suggest that the other decision-makers 
are making choices that diverge from their preferences.  If anything, the fact 
that the choices of this group of decision-makers are stable across frames might 
make us more confident the choice reflects a considered judgment by the 
chooser. 
Turning to the non-welfarist criticism of paternalism, here too one can 
make the case that quasi-paternalism is more in keeping with the underlying 
concerns as compared to consistent choice paternalism.  Loosely speaking, the 
non-welfarist argument is based on the idea that there is value in treating people 
as if they are correctly expressing their preferences even if they are known to 
be making a mistake – and that the alternative to doing so is infantilizing.32  
Certainly, quasi-paternalism is subject to this concern – after all, it is based on 
the premise that the inconsistent choosers are making mistakes in at least one 
of the frames in which they are observed. However, it is also the case that, 
having made a quasi-paternalistic judgment about which frame to adopt, the 
case for adopting that frame can only be strengthened by treating people as if 
they were not making mistakes. 
To see why, return to the example of automatic enrollment in a govern-
ment employer’s retirement plan, discussed above.  Suppose that the employer 
decided to adopt participation as the default option, and assume further that it 
made this decision in a quasi-paternalistic way.  Which default would best pro-
mote social welfare depends on the preferences of both the consistent and the 
inconsistent choosers, and since the choice of which default to implement here 
was (by assumption) made in a quasi-paternalistic way, we know that the 
choices of the consistent choosers were assumed to reflect their preferences.  
Suppose further that the policymaker determined that some percentage (X) of 
the inconsistent choosers would be better off under participation, where X is 
some number less than or equal to 100.  Importantly, we know that when par-
ticipation is made the default, 100% of the inconsistent decision-makers would 
choose to participate.33  And if we were to assume that none of those decision-
makers were making a mistake, we would have to conclude that 100% of the 
inconsistent decision-makers preferred participation (at least under the partici-
pation default).  Hence, the case for setting participation to be the default would 
be even stronger than under the judgment that was actually made.  Thus, poli-
cies that are quasi-paternalistic can be thought of as being consistent with the  
 32. See, e.g., Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Behavioral Law and Eco-
nomics: Its Origins, Fatal Flaws, and Implications for Liberty, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 
1033, 1088 (2012). 
 33. This argument assumes that there are no inconsistent choosers who specifi-
cally choose whichever option is not the default.  The argument can be extended to take 
this possibility into account. 
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autonomy concerns behind non-paternalism because treating everyone as mak-
ing a correct decision would simply bolster the case for whichever frame was 
thought to maximize social welfare absent that assumption.  In other words, if 
a nudge is adopted on a quasi-paternalistic basis, the (welfarist) case for it can 
only be made stronger by taking the inconsistent choosers’ preferences at face 
value. 
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CHOICE OF NUDGE VS. MANDATE 
The notion of quasi-paternalism provides a way of distinguishing between 
various types of behaviorally informed policies in terms of the extent to which 
they implicate paternalist concerns.  Specifically, the framework suggests that 
there is a sense in which mandates are more paternalistic than nudges.  This is 
because although nudges can be quasi-paternalistic, mandates can generally 
only be justified on grounds of consistent choice paternalism.34 
To understand why the arguments for mandates must go beyond quasi-
paternalism, we can modify our running example to consider an employer that 
is choosing between nudging its employees to enroll in a retirement savings 
plan (by setting participation to be the default) and requiring its employees to 
participate in the plan (say, as a condition of their employment). 
As summarized in Table 1, below, the key difference between the two 
policies has to do with the change in behavior of those employees who would 
consistently choose not to participate (even when participation is the default), 
when given the option.  Employees in this group would end up participating 
under the mandate but would not participate under the nudge.  In contrast, those 
employees who would consistently choose to participate under both defaults 
would end up participating under both the nudge and the mandate, as would 
the inconsistent decision-makers (whose choices simply mirror the default).  
Thus, whether the nudge or the mandate yields higher social welfare will gen-
erally turn on whether the employees who end up with a different option under 
the two policies are better off under one or the other.  Hence, for the mandate 
to be better than the nudge for social welfare, it must be the case that forcing 
those decision-makers who consistently choose non-participation to participate 
would actually make those decision-makers better off.35  Although this is the-
oretically plausible (the employees who consistently prefer non-participation 
might be present-biased and be better off choosing to save more), it is the type 
of thinking that violates quasi-paternalism; i.e., it is based on the idea that the 
consistent choosers are mistaken.  
 34. For present purposes, I will set aside other types of situation-specific consid-
erations that might justify a mandate over a nudge such as third-party effects or admin-
istrative costs.  The argument developed in this section expands on an argument 
sketched in Jacob Goldin & Nicholas Lawson, Defaults, Mandates, and Taxes: Policy 
Design with Active and Passive Decision-Makers, 18 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 438 (2016). 
 35. See Goldin and Lawson, supra note 34.  For similar analyses in the context of 
401(k) plans, see Bubb & Pildes, supra note 30, at 1625, and Cass R. Sunstein, Nudges 
vs. Shoves, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 210, 212 (2014). 
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Thus, there is a sense in which mandates are not only less liberal than 
nudges in the sense of preserving choice, they are also more paternalistic, in 
that they are appealing only if one believes the consistent choosers are making 
a mistake. 
 
Table 1: Choices Under Mandates vs. Nudges 
 Participation Nudge Participation Mandate 
Inconsistent Choosers Participate Participate 
Consistent Choosers Who 
Choose Participation 
Participate Participate 
Consistent Choosers Who 
Choose Non-Participation 
Don’t Participate Participate 
 
 
This conclusion that nudges can be quasi-paternalistic but mandates can-
not helps shed light on a recent debate in the behavioral law and economics 
literature. Bubb and Pildes have claimed that the arguments used to support 
nudges suggest the desirability of mandates as well.36  As they put it, “[I]t 
would be surprising if the main policy implication of the mounting evidence 
documenting the failure of individual choice was a turn toward regulatory in-
struments that preserve individual choice.”37  But the discussion in this section 
shows the conclusion that some individuals are making mistakes does not in 
itself imply that mandates are desirable – the fact that frames affect the behav-
ior of the inconsistent choosers does not imply anything about the quality of 
the choices made by the consistent choosers.  Hence, Mill’s epistemic argu-
ment against paternalism applies here in full force: a nudge will be more desir-
able than a mandate unless policymakers have good reason to think that they 
know which option would be best for the consistent choosers and are confident 
enough in that determination to override the beliefs of the choosers themselves.  
For this reason, even a committed welfarist should generally be reluctant to 
favor a mandate over a nudge in settings where frames affect behavior. 
 
 
 36. Bubb & Pildes, supra note 30. 
 37. Id. at 1595. 
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